History of Headquarters, 409th Bombardment Group (L) as of May 1944:

1. Strength of organization as of 31 May 1944:

Officers: 31 Enlisted Men: 64

2. Awards and Decorations:

Colonel Preston P. Pender Lt. Colonel Allison Maxwell

Lt. Colonel R. W. Yearwood

Lt. Colonel R. W. Yearwood

NARRATIVE

For officers and men of the 409th, as for the hundreds of thousands of other American soldiers concentrated in the British Isles, May was the month of "sweating out" D-Day. With little more than two weeks of combat flying in the ETO behind it, the Group found itself playing an important role in the mounting aerial offensive against Hitler’s Europe, an offensive that could mean only one thing: prelude to Invasion.

But how long was the prelude to last? When would the curtain go up on D-Day, itself? That question was uppermost in every man’s mind. The end of the month left it still unanswered, but the signs were everywhere, for every man to read. The combat crews, on their missions over enemy territory, noted the increasing extent of flooded areas along the "invasion coast," and the growing concentration of shipping, with emphasis on landing craft of all types, in the ports of Southern England. Midway in the month, all leaves and furloughs were canceled. Ground personnel were restricted to a 2-mile radius of the base on their 24-hour passes, and combat crews were denied trips of any distance that could not be traveled within 2 hours. Returning from London, Mecca of all GI’s on leave, they told of Red Cross Clubs, theaters and night spots now almost deserted by all except Air Corps personnel, of fewer trains, and fewer travelers. Those who read the newspapers noted that all travel out of the United Kingdom has been banned. Those who listened to the radio hear the sing-song doggerel from Station Calais One, always ending with the chant, "D-Day forces of invasion, we are waiting for you"

But for the chapter of the pre-Invasion story closest to them, the 409th had only to look at their own record of activities for the month of May: of 28 missions flown in 19 days, of 623.4 tons of bombs dropped on enemy installations.

Those figures speak not only for pilots flying swift ships in tight formations, for bombardier-navigators charting their course down flak alleys to release bombs on pin-point targets, for gunners searching unfriendly skies for interfering fighters. They speak also for mechanics and crew chiefs, for ordnance and armament men, for photo technicians and intelligence clerks, for communications operators and parachute riggers, for operations clerks and mess hall cooks, for medics and drivers, for clerks in orderly rooms and clerks in supply rooms. All of them were called on for a sustained effort in May because of a master plan which said that the enemy’s communication must be disrupted, the Luftwaffe must be knocked out, and the "secret weapon" launching sites must be neutralized to insure the success of D-Day operations.

Our first target of the month, coming upon the morning of May 1, was the marshaling yard at Montignies-sur-Sambre. Thirty-five ships took off, the first box led by the combination of Col. Maxwell and Lt. Taugner, the second by Capt. Wolf and Lt. Corey. All returned, but in terms of bombing results, the story was disappointing. Col. Maxwell was dejected but forthright in assuming responsibility for the "snafu" of the first box. "I failed to turn on the bomb master switch," he told the interrogating officer. The box bombed on the deputy, but with poor results, as the strike photos proved. The second box returned with bombs, after losing the formation and failing to make rendezvous with the fighter escort.

Before the last report had been finished on this mission, another one was being prepared in S-2 and Operations. The field order called for an attack on the locomotive repair works of Blanc-Misseron, 7 miles northeast of Valenciennes. Again 35 ships took off, paced by Col. Maxwell, and Lt. Taugner at the head of the first box and Col. Yearwood and Lt. Corey at the head of the second. But a heavy ground haze cut visibility at the target to little more than a mile, and returning crews said that they did not think the target they bombed was the one for which they had been briefed. The strike photos proved them correct in this assumption; their bombs fell on an unidentified mill and railroad terminus four and a half miles from the assigned target.

So no one was surprised when the same target was assigned the Group the following day. This time Col. Pender and Lt.. Rafalow, leading the first box, and Capt. Davis and Lt. Salzman, heading the second, had no difficulty locating and identifying the target, and the strike photos confirmed their reports of excellent bombing results.

Weather interfered with operations the next four days, but on the 7th, 37 ships were again dispatched against the Blanc Misseron repair works. They found the target covered by 8 to 10/10 cloud, and returned without bombing.

A mission against the Noball at Ailly-le-Haut Clocher on the afternoon of the same day, and one against railroad siding at Aerschot the following day were similarly fruitless. The men had some uncomplimentary things to say about the weather are the people who attempted to predict it.

It was clear enough on the afternoon of the 8th, however, to permit good bombing of a Noball target at Bellevue. The first box, led by Major Milow and Lt. Ertler and bombing by flights of sixes, got direct hits or near misses on the platform and rectangular buildings. Bombs of the second box, led by Col. Stocking and Lt. Clement, fell south of the target area.

May 9th proved to be a really rough day for the 409th. Thirty-four ships of the Group had another try at Aerschot marshaling yard in the morning, but results were again disappointing. An error in navigation resulted in the bombing of the town of Solesmes by the first box. The second box, not satisfied as to the identity of the target, did not bomb.

It was flak on the afternoon mission that completed the black picture for the Group that day. The target was a Noball at Bonnieres in the dreaded Hesdin area. Only the third box, led by Col. Yearwood and Lt. Merrill, dropped their bombs, and they fell in fields north of the target area. The first box, led by Col. Maxwell and Lt. Taugner, could not identify the target in time to bomb. Lt. Argyle’s ship, leading the second box, received a direct hit by flak on its second pass at the target and went down. One chute was reported to have been seen before the ship crashed. Of the 35 ships dispatched, 25 suffered flak damage, in addition to the ship which was lost. Lt. Corey was Lt. Argyle’s bombardier-navigator; his gunners were S/Sgt. William H. Olglesbee and S/Sgt. Louis W. Dirickson.

The one bright part of the picture was the heroic feat of Col. Yearwood. In the target area, he was wounded by a piece of flak which severed the optic nerve of his left eye. Nonetheless, he maintained control of his ship and led his box out of enemy territory. Back over England, he left the formation and brought his plane and crew safely to an emergency field near the coast

The marshaling yard at Tournai, Belgium, was the target of 29 planes of the Group on the morning of May 20. The first box, led by Major Powell and Lt. Saathoff, dropped their bombs on and around the passenger station, with results described as poor. The second box, led by Capt. Huff and Lt. Lever, got good results with burst observed on loaded tracks in the target area.

The jinx of Aerschot marshaling yard continued to hold for the Group in the course of the next two missions. The 31 ships sent out in the afternoon of the 10th never got to the target, but were recalled because of weather, which was 9 to 10/10 enroute. Poor visibility prevented bombing of the same target by a 38 ship formation the following day.

Things went better on the mission to Marville airdrome on the morning of the 12th. There was no enemy opposition, either from flak or fighters, and the leading combinations of Milow-Ertler and Gustafson-McEvilly reported good bombing results, with bursts in the dispersal area and fuel and ammunition dumps--reports which were borne out by the strike photos.

When the second field order of the day came in calling for another attack on the Noball at Bonniers, everyone knew what the flak story would be. They weren’t mistaken. Intense and accurate heavy flak fire at the target damaged 25 of 37 planes in the Group’s formation, but this time they all bombed with results described as fair, and no planes were lost.

Another Noball mission helped restore the Group’s confidence in its bombing the next day -- the 13th of the month, at that. Visibility at the target, Maisoncelle, was poor because of ground haze, so returning crews were not sure of their bombing results. The Huff-Lever and Dunbar-Gable teams, which led the 37-ship formation, sweated out the strike photos. When they came from the photo lab, they showed that hits had been scored on two skis, the two rectangular buildings and the "E" building. Still later, when all the reports were in, the 409th was credited with suspension of the site.

The Group needed that boost, for the next three missions it sent out yielded only more disappointments. Cloud cover at the target prevented bombing of Creil airdrome on the 15th, bombing of Benerville coastal gun emplacements was poor on the 19th, and bombs brought back from Beauvais/Title airdrome on the 20th because of inability to identify the target.

It was the 36th mission on May 22 that provided one of the most dramatic incidents of the Group’s combat experience. It happened on the way out to the French coast, after the 38-ship formation had dropped its bombs in a beautiful pattern on a hangar, workshops, and taxi strip of Evreau/Fauville airdrome. Conditions had been perfect at the target: good visibility, no flak, and the bomb burst had looked very, very nice on Jerry’s installations. Then, just east of Elbeuf, the flak started boiling up. Major Milow and Capt. Dunbar, the box leaders, were employing evasive action, but the stuff was accurate. Lt. Peck’s ship, flying number three in Capt. Dunbar’s flight, received a direct hit and dropped out of formation, its right engine on fire. When last seen, it was still flying under control, and one chute had been seen to open, but returning crews doubted that it could have made it to the coast.

In the number four ship of the low flight of Capt. Dunbar’s box, Lt. Wheeler was also having trouble. Flak had riddled his right gas tank, knocked out his right engine. Bert dropped out of formation, feathered his right prop, and struggled on Channel-ward. But the ship was vibrating badly and losing altitude fast. Once past the French coast, the cold, dirty water of the Channel seemed to surge up to meet him. At 2,000 feet, Bert ordered his gunners, S/Sgt. Richard Thompson and Sgt. Jack Carne, to bail out. The plane was less than half that altitude when he followed them. As he dropped, the ill-fated Havoc cut the water and burst into flames even as it sank. Bert could feel the heat as he, too, hit the water.

The three airmen lost no time inflating their Mae Wests, and Bert and Thompson climbed into their parachute dinghies. In the meantime, escorting P-47’s circled overhead, signaling a British destroyer which was pursuing two German E-boats scarcely two miles away. After what seemed a long, long time to the three chilled fliers, the destroyer came up, and they were hauled aboard to a warm welcome and even warmer food and drink. The American fliers and the British seamen found they had a lot in common --- the destroyer was one of the "over-age" fleet that President Roosevelt had given Britain in exchange for bases in the Western Hemisphere.

After its excellent bombing at Evreux/Fauville, the attacks of the Group were centered for the next four missions on other airfields in France. Bombing of Beaumont/Le Roger airfield by three boxes on the 24th ranged from fair to good; that of Abberville/Drucat on the same day, from poor to good. Only one box was able to bomb at Moncy/Drucat on the 25th, and its results were described as poor. The other box found the target obscured by cloud. At Beaumont-sur-Oise airfield on the 26th, the first box, led by Major Milow and Lt. Ertler, laid an excellent concentration of bombs on the target, scoring hits on shelters and fuel storage. The second box, led by Capt. Gustafson and Lt. McEvilly, also laid a fine pattern of bombs, but on gun emplacements and unidentified buildings 1600 feet from the M.P.I., results which were graded as poor.

Thus far in its brief month and a half of combat operations, the Group had known some rough days, undergone some shaking experiences. But all that had gone on before, was overshadowed by the developments of a single day, the 27th of May, which took a toll of nine missing in action, three killed, two wounded, and four aircraft lost.

There were two missions that day, both against the marshaling yard at Amiens. The first never did bomb its objective. While still 27 miles from the target, intense and accurate flak picked off the first there ships of the lead box, causing the remainder to scatter and re-form. The deputy lead ship, piloted by apt. Norton and the number three ship, flown buy Lt. Gregg, both of the 640th Squadron, crashed in the vicinity of Formerie. Capt. Huff, lead pilot, nursed his ship back to the Channel on single engine, then he and his bombardier-navigator, Lt. Lever, were forced to bail out. His gunners had already bailed out over France. Their story is told in more detail in the 640th Squadron’s history.

The May 27th Amiens chapter, however, does not end there. Bomber Command ordered another attack against the same target that evening. Taking off at 1903 hours, the lead ship, piloted by Capt. Dunbar, was hit by the last ship in a formation of P-51’s passing over the field, and both ships crashed and burst into flames. Accounts by the first arrivals on the scene of the crash vary, and the sole survivor of the accident, S/Sgt. Mattei, Capt. Dunbar’s turret gunner, is not unnaturally confused about what happened after the crash. He was badly burned while attempting to get Captain Dunbar out of the cockpit of the flaming plane. It is believed that Capt. Dunbar, his bombagator, Lt. Merrill, and Lt. Jones, the Group Photographic Officer, who was flying as tunnel gunner, were killed by the crash. Mrs. Elizabeth Ann Everitt, housewife from nearby Paddle Wharf Farm, and a passing cyclist, Sgt. John P. Hartman of the 78th Fighter Group, were killed in the explosion of bombs in the wreckage as they sought to extricate members of the crew.

Lts. Thomas and Gable, deputy leaders of the first box, took over the lead, and the formation went out to deliver its bomb load on the Amiens yard. Results were described as poor.

The next day, the Group undertook to raise a trust fund for four-year-old Tony Everitt, orphaned son of the woman who had lost her life in the gallant effort to aid the 409th crash victims.

Something different in the way of objectives was assigned to the Group for its next mission, on the 28th. It was a chateau at Bruges/St. Michel, occupied by a German naval RDF headquarters of extreme importance. Thirty-four planes of the Group attacked in three boxes, led by Major Powell and Lt. Saathoff, Lt. Davis and Lt. Salzman, and Capt. May and Lt. Sammons. The bombing by the first two boxes was judged to be gross, but the third box rated an excellent, with a good concentration of bursts on buildings in and around the M.P.I.

Bombing of a Noball target at Vacqueriette by 36 ships on the same day was poor.

The Group wound up its operations for May with a grand splash -- the splash of bomb bursts on Achiet airdrome that won a judgment of good and excellent for the two boxes. The first box, led by Col. Stocking and Lt. Clement, got direct hits and near misses on an ammunition dump, taxi strips and the perimeter track at the southeast end of the field. The second box, led by Lt. Farr and Lt. Rafalow, got direct hits and near misses on four camouflaged revetments and the taxi strips serving them and on a large, unidentified building.

A recapitulation of the Group’s operations in its second month of combat shows that in one of its three assigned objectives -- that of playing Havoc with the Luftwaffe -- it did a fine job. Of nine missions to as many enemy airfields, the bombing results at six were good to excellent. At two of the remaining three, weather prevented attack; at only one was the bombing poor. In the Battle of the Noballs, it suspended one site, did good bombing at a second, fair at a third, poor at two others, was unable to attack the sixth. The third objective -- disrupting enemy communications -- proved to be the Group’s "bete noir." In eight missions to marshaling yards, no attacks were made at four, at three the bombing was poor, and only one was the bombing fair. Three missions to a locomotive repair works resulted in one poor job, one excellent, no attack on the third. Of two tactical targets assigned ----coastal gun emplacements and an RDF headquarters -- bombing was poor at the first, gross to excellent at the second.

That, in effect, was May, a month of combat experience gained as the fury of aerial invasion reached it height. The Group had learned a lot in that month, and it hoped that it would not have to wait long for the opportunity to put its new knowledge to work in support of the invasion by the ground forces.

History of 409th Bombardment Group (L), as of June 1944

1. Strength of the Unit as of 30 June 1944

Officers: 38 Enlisted Men: 69

NARRATIVE

The rarest of all June days -- D-Day -- fell on the sixth of the month, and for the men of the 409th, as for the thousands of other Americans stationed with Air Corps units in Britain, the entire complexion of the war was changed with H-Hour.

It was no longer confined to a series of aerial offensives against Hitler’s European fortress, a setting of the stage for a drama whose curtain time was known only to the stage manager. The curtain had gone up. This was the day toward which all their activities had been directed. Now the objective had shifted....from preparation for a hypothetical invasion to actual support of a very real one. Here at last was the war which could be followed on maps, whose progress could be plotted with battle lines and bomb lines. One only had to listen to the comments in mess hall and barracks, crew room and operations room, to sense the new purpose, the new hope that D-Day brought to the 409th. You caught it in the remark of a cook, mixing meat loaf in one of the kitchens for noon chow: "Now we’re getting somewhere. Now we can get this thing over and go home". And you got it in the comment of a tunnel gunner, returning from his first invasion mission: "It makes it seem a lot more worth while to know that our bombs are doing some good for those guys down on the ground,"

But what was it actually like , that D-Day morning? Most of the men who helped prepare the Group’s first D-Day mission, and even more of the men who flew it say that they will never forget any part of it. But those who do, and those who weren’t there have the graphic description written by a Yank staff correspondent, Sgt. Walter Peters, who flew with the Group that day.

"Inside the hut", Sgt. Peters wrote, "in a small ante-room, a little group of men stood before the large maps of France on the wall. Outside the room, a white-helmeted MP, with an air of great importance, watched carefully to see that nobody but authorized persons could enter. For many days now the MP had been standing guard in that same position, the same look on his face, the same scrutinizing eyes. Prior to this particular morning, only the Colonel and his immediate staff members had been allowed to enter the little room which the men of the Group called the Second Front Room. Now there were the Colonel, his staff, and the box leaders and their deputies -- men who were to lead the Group over the target in support of the ground troops already in France.

"Well, gentlemen," said the Colonel, "this is it."

"Col. Preston P. Pender, of Hendersonville, N.C., the CO of the Group, didn’t elaborate any further. To the men around him it was quite obvious what their chief meant by ‘this is it’.

"The Huns," said a Lieutenant Colonel, "are expected to rush troops here (pointing to a spot on the map) and we have got to attack at these crossroads at exactly____hours".

The men looked at their watches. There was a slight pause.

"Christ", said a major, "that doesn’t give us much more than a half-hour for takeoff".

"Yes", said the Lieutenant Colonel, "maybe 35 minutes at most. Bomber Command says you will fly at___feet".

A pilot with First-Lieutenant bars on his collars protested. "Hell, that’s suicide", he said.

Another Lieutenant interrupted. "No, no". he said, "it’l be all right. Anyway, there’s not a damn thing we can do about it. The men are in there and we’ve just got to do the job".

And to continue the first-hand account of the mission, we pick up Sgt. Peters flying in ‘The Avenger’ with Lt. Tommy Farr, after he has left the English coast:

A few minutes later his (S/Sgt. Neicy Clopton, turret gunner) voice came over the intercom again, but this time it was high-pitched with excitement. We were over the English Channel where it was quite obvious that there was a war on. "By God, look at the ships !" he yelled.

It was a sight never to be forgotten. The navies of the world seemed to be concentrated in the Channel that day. For mile you could see ships, like spots of pepper in a light soup. There were ships passing each other like traffic on Times Square during a pre-war holiday week-end. Those heading back seemed to be traveling faster. Maybe the fact that they had already unloaded their cargo was the reason for the speed. Major Arthur Milow, of Omaha, Neb., flying in one of our lower elements, reported that he actually saw men standing side by side on ships heading toward the French coast. The England-bound ships, Milow observed, were empty.

"Now were over the French coast. Peering through binoculars, I could see no sign of life anywhere. There were the little French farm houses and long, white roads without traffic. We passed over the flooded section. Then over enemy land again"

Just at the tip of the peninsula, there were great columns of smoke, maybe about 3,000 feet high. Some of the other planes had been over that area shortly before. We wondered if it had been the heavies that had been seen heading for the English side of the Channel.

Our plane began to weave. Other planes did the same. We were on the bomb run now and Jerry was shooting flak at us. There were two bursts to one side. Big black stuff that broke off in small raggedly pieces, shooting all over the sky and cutting like a razor. But we were enjoying a holiday compared to the elements below ours.

"My God, look at the stuff", Major Milow yelled over the intercom.

His box was far below ours. Maybe about 3,000 feet from the ground, rich gravy for enemy anti-aircraft batteries. There was no use for the Major and his box to take evasive action. There was no room to evade the stuff. The flak bursts were everywhere, like raindrops in a heavy spring shower.

One if the planes in the lower box went down. Others, a little luckier, began to limp toward home with battle damage.

Some of the men who flew that day may detect some inaccuracies in Yank’s reporting, but the account does help those who didn’t fly to visualize the scene and share the experience.

Three boxes of 18 ships each flew that mission. The first box was led by Col. Stocking and Lt. Clement; the second, by Lt. Gates and Lt. Bauer; the third by Major Milow and Lt. Ertler. The target was a railroad junction near Valognes, half-way up the Cherbourg peninsula. The weather was bad -- 8/10 cloud cover at the target, forcing all three boxes to make a second bomb run. The first box went down to 3,000 feet for the second run and encountered intense and accurate flak. Lt. Winn’s ship, flying deputy lead, was hit and crashed in the target area. Bombs of this box fell short of the target.

The second and third boxes made their second run at 10,000 feet. The second box was again unable to bomb, and results of the bombing of the third box were unobserved.

The Group’s second mission that unforgettable day, and its 50th since beginning operations, was against the marshaling yard at Abancourt. The weather in the afternoon was even worse than it had been in the morning, with the result that the second box was unable to find the target and ten ships of the first box got separated from the leader in the heavy clouds enroute to the target. Seven ships led by Lt. Bills and Lt. McEvilly, deputy leaders who took over when Col. Stocking’s radio went out, went in at low altitude, encountering flak all the way, found the target and bombed.

Such was D-Day for the 409th.

The poor flying weather continued, almost uninterrupted, throughout the month, and Mr. Tennyson’s famed line about June; "Then if ever come perfect days", would have brought sneers around this base, if anyone had thought to quote it. Nonetheless, the 409th flew the impressive total of 27 missions in 19 days during the month, dropping a total of 910 tons of bombs.

Three of these missions were flown prior to June 6, and the targets were representative of pre-D-Day objectives: a Noball at Campegne les Hesdin on June 2, Chartres airdrome on the 3rd, and coastal gun emplacements at Pointe du Hoe on the 4th.

With D-Day, however, the attacks shifted to concentrate on the enemy’s transportation system. For a period of ten days (including June 6) in which 13 missions were flown, the targets consisted entirely of railroad junctions and marshaling yards, highway junctions and bridges.

Three boxes, paced by the Milow-Ertler, May-Sammons and Farr-Rafalow combinations, got excellent results in their bombing of a highway crossroads in the Foret de Cerisy on June 7. The same day, the first two leaders again headed two boxes in an attack on the railroad junction at Valognes, with results described as fair.

Lt. Davis and Lt. Salzman got good results in their bombing when they led 42 ships in an attack on the railroad center at Periers on June 8. Only one box, led by Lt. Cotter and Lt. Himmel, out of the three dispatched, was able to bomb the highway bridge at St. Sauveur le Vicomte on June 10. They laid their bombs in an excellent pattern on the approaches to the bridge and the bridge itself.

The mission of June 11 dealt a low blow to the Group. Moments after take off, two 641st ships collided and crashed, Killing Lt. Armistead and his two gunners, Staff Sergeant Holiday and Sergeant Donnelly. Staff Sergeant P. Pendleton, one of the gunners in the other plane, was also killed when he attempted to bail out too close to the ground. His pilot, Lt. Beckett, was able to make a crash landing, and survived along with his other gunner, Staff Sergeant Edgmon.

On this June 11 mission weather prevented bombing by by two of the three boxes sent against the railroad junction at Aunaye-sur-Odon.

The same target was ordered for attack the following day, and the excellent results this time brought a message of commendation from General Anderson. Leaders of the three boxes were the teams of Milow-Ertler, Gustafson-McEvilly, and Higgins-Cordson.

June weather again showed its hand on the 13th. In the morning, a formation led by Lt. Davis and Lt. Salzman found its target, the marshaling yard at Rennes, covered by 10/10 cloud, so they bombed a casual target, a railroad junction at Tribahou, with good results. In the afternoon, another formation found its primary target, the railroad junction at Canisy, obscured by clouds. The third box bombed the secondary with poor results. The first box bombed a target of opportunity with fair results. The second box did not bomb.

The weather was good, for a change, on the 14th, but malfunction of the bomb sight caused poor bombing at Mezidon marshaling yard after the formation made several passes at the target. The same day, a formation attacked the railroad junction at Domfront with fair results. Of six flights dispatched against a railroad junction at Conde sur Noireau on the 14th, one flight, led by Lt. Sargent and Lt. Olshak, got excellent results.

This long string of attacks against the enemy’s transport system was ended on the 15th of the month. German fuel stores became the objective of the Group for its next three missions.

Two boxes, led by Col. Stocking and Lt. Clement, Lt. Gates and Lt. Bauer, did excellent area bombing in the Foret D-Audaine on the 15th. Only the flight of six led by Thomas & Thomas got good results in an attack on La Loupe on the 17th. Weather again prevented bombing by the formation which was sent against the Foret de Conches on the 18th

On June 13th, seven days after the invasion of the continent by Allied forces, the enemy’s much touted secret weapon, a winged bomb launched from No-ball sites, made its appearance over Southern England. Despite the fact that many of these bombs were reaching their target, the London area, the weight of the Allied bombing attacks had not been shifted from invasion support targets to the launching sites. Now, June 21st, a week after the debut of the "buzz bomb" the 409th was directed to attack four of the launching sites in as many days.

All four of these missions were flown on Pathfinder, employing the "blind bombing" technique. The results at Montoqueil on the 21st, and at Ligescourt on the 21st, were unobserved because of cloud cover. On another Pathfinder mission against an enemy strong point at La Mare a Canards on the 22nd, the camera recorded poor results.

Cameras recorded excellent results at Bientques on the 23rd, and results were thought to be good on the basis of visual observation at Zadusques on the 24th.

A return to fuel dumps and the transport system wound up the month’s missions. The first box of a formation led by the Davis-Salzman team got good results in bombing the Fuel dump at Bruz on the 24th. Then bad weather set in for five days, the Group flew no missions. When our planes did go out again on the last day of the month, clouds prevented bombing of the petrol rail-head at Cond sur Virfe in the morning. In the afternoon, the formation bombed the highway intersection at Thury Harcourt on Pathfinder.

So ended June, the month of invasion which gave the lie to the poet Tennyson. Thanks to the weather, it had not been the month of incessant activity and exciting progress that the Group had expected and hoped for. In spite of it, however, units of the Ninth Air Force had done a good job. They had the word of General Brereton for it.

History of the 409th Bombardment Group as of July, 1944

1. Strength of the Unit as of 31 July 1944;

Officers: 40 Enlisted Men: 70

NARRATIVE

The unfavorable weather, which had hampered operations during the month of invasion, continued throughout July. It was a trying period for the 409th. Afer the fall of Cherbourg on June 27, progress on the far shore admitted no spectacular developments for almost a month, and the Group’s contribution to more rapid progress was checked by the bad weather. A more immediate cause for restless uncertainty was felt in a change of the Group’s command. Colonel Preston P. Pender, popular commanding officer of the group since its activation, was relieved, and Lt. Colonel Thomas R. Ford assumed the command on July 4. The group felt that it was in for a period of tightening-up and perhaps general upheaval.

The new C.O. came to the group from another Havoc group, the 416th, where he had been operations officer, then air executive officer. A veteran A-20 pilot, he had served for four years in the Caribbean with the first tactical Air Force unit outside the United States to be equipped with the plane. At his first staff meeting, he impressed on his senior officers the necessity for more rigid observance of military discipline and courtesy throughout the organization.

Changes in key personnel were not long in following. To fill the post of air executive, left vacant by the transfer of Lt. Colonel Crabtree to Bomber Command, Lt. Colonel Stocking was relieved of command of the 642nd Squadron and assigned to Group Headquarters, Major Gustafson succeeded him as commanding officer of the squadron. Major Powell, operations officer of the 641st Squadron, was also transferred to Headquarters to become Group training officer. The post of ground executive was left vacant by the transfer of Lt. Colonel Blake to Air Force.

On the operational side, the first four days of the month comprised a series of stand-downs and postponed and scrubbed missions. When a mission finally got off late in the afternoon of the fifth day, it was Pathfinder-led. It turned out to be one to remember.

The target was a Noball headquarters located at the Chateau de Frohen in the Pas de Calais area, No flak was experienced at the target, perhaps because of complete overcast, but on the way out, a break in the clouds disclosed that the Pathfinder had brought them directly over Oisemont. The resultant flak, accurate and intense, was no surprise to anyone. The lead ship of the first box of 16, piloted by Col. Stocking, got a direct hit in the bomb bay, and the left engine cut out. With a fire raging in the bomb bay, the ship dropped out of formation and headed for the coast. The interphone was out, and over the Channel, both gunners bailed out. Both engines were cutting out alternately when the ship reached the English coast, so the Colonel was forced to land on a grass fighter strip near the coast. Neither he nor his bombardier-navigator, Lt. Clements, was injured despite the failure of the brakes to stop their progress through a barbed wire entanglement and over a ditch that sheared off their landing gear. Sgt. Dvorak, the tunnel gunner was picked up in the Channel after drifting in a dinghy for five hours. It was his first mission. The turret gunner, Sgt. Needham, is missing in action.

In the meantime, the lead ship of the second box had also received a direct flak hit which severely wounded the bombardier-navigator, Lt. Bauer. Lt. Gates, the pilot, got the ship back across the Channel on a single engine and then made a dead-stick landing on an emergency strip near the coast. While Sgt. Norris ran in search of an ambulance, and Lt. Gates tried to contact one on the radio, Sgt. Heath removed Lt. Bauer from the nose of the ship and applied first aid which the doctors later declared saved his life. Of the 32 ships which flew that mission, 20 other suffered battle damage, as well.

The following day, the group bombed six railroad bridges in the Alencon area by flights of six. The flight led by Major Gustafson and Lt. McEvilly got good results, but others got poor and gross results or no photographic coverage.

The target for the group’s 75th mission on July 7th was in close support of the ground forces: troops and equipment in woods at Fontaine le Pin, south of Caen. Area bombing by boxes of 18 led by Capt. Davis and Lt. Salzman, Major Milow and Lt. Ertler, produced satisfactory results.

For the next 11 days, the group’s bombing efforts were directed against fuel and ammunition dumps south of the beachhead, the single exception in five missions being a railroad junction at Caen

Only one flight was able to bomb this junction on the first mission of the 8th because drifting smoke and the changed appearance of the target area made the aiming point impossible for most of the bombardiers to identify.

On a second mission sent out the afternoon of the same day, the bombardiers were unable to identify the hard-to-spot primary, a fuel depot at Rennes. One flight, led by Lt. Sargent and Lt. Olshk, got good results in an attack on the secondary, a road embankment and bridge at Combourg.

The same target, the Rennes fuel depot, was ordered for the following day, and this time the flight led by Major Milow and Lt. Ertler got good results at the primary, and the flight led by Capt. Davis and Lt. Salzman got good results at the secondary, the Dol de Bretagne road bridge. The ship flown by Lt. Armstrong received a direct hit from flak at the target, and went down in flames with no chutes observed. Sgt. Assaro and Sgt. Hill, Lt. Armstrong’s gunners are listed with him as missing in action.

An attack on the fuel dump in the Foret d’Andaine on July 11 was Pathfinder-led and 10/10 overcast at the target prevented observation of results.

There followed a six-day period of stand-downs and scrubbed missions, briefings and postponements, overcast mornings and rainy afternoons. Colonel Ford decided that his orders for stricter military discipline were not having the desired effect, and the entire personnel of the Group started drilling for four hours a week, as a consequence. The training program swung into high gear, and Major Powell circulated a training memorandum to squadron commanders and operations officers that spoke darkly of whipping posts and joint wrenchers, M-1 and M-14, as inducements to training.

Word that General Brereton, Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force, was expected to visit the base produced a flurry of scrubbing and polishing and general popping-to-attention for three successive days. On the third day, he visited the base of the 416th Group for a presentation of awards ceremony at which Capt. Turnquist and Capt. Bills received the D.F.C. But that was as close as he came to the 409th.

On the 17th, weather finally permitted a mission to get off for another fuel and ammunition dump at Bruz. The bombardiers found the target area so badly mutilated that it was impossible for most of them to pick up the aiming point, although all six flights made two passes at the target. Only the flight led by the Thomas-Thomas team bombed the primary with fair results; the other flights dropped their bombs on the secondary, the Montfort railroad bridge, and casual targets, railroad lines and junctions in the vicinity.

July 18th brought the Group another target in close support of the British 2nd Army, southeast of Caen, designated as the Demouville "C" area. The first box, led by Major Gustafson and Lt. McEvilly, bombed with results satisfactory to the ground forces, but the second box was unable to bomb because of improper hook-up of the pilot direction indicator in the lead ship.

This mission was part of a combined air-ground attack in which all eleven groups of IX Bomber Command took part, along with RAF heavies, 1000 heavies of the Eighth Air Force, ten fighter-bomber groups of IX TAC, and 40 squadrons of the 83rd and 84th Groups. Immediately after the bombardment, three armored division and three infantry divisions launched an attack southeast of Caen, driving a salient approximately ten miles long by five miles wide into enemy-held territory.

The next day, the 409th resumed attacks on railroad bridges and fuel dumps. A Pathfinder mission on the 19th had as its target the railroad bridge at St. Hilaire du Harcourt, an important facility for the enemy’s efforts to transport reinforcements to and around St. Lo.

Cloud cover obscured both primary and secondary targets on July 20th in the 409th’s effort to bomb Senonches Forest where several million litres of fuel were stored. All ships returned with their bombs.

On the 23rd, a Pathfinder mission had for its target the Laigle-railroad bridge. Comments of returning pilots and bombardiers indicated that this was the most satisfactory experience with Pathfinder thus far. Crews favor PFF missions when the equipment is functioning smoothly -- they have learned that they mean less likelihood of encountering flak.

On another Pathfinder mission the following day, clouds at the target were only 3/10, so crews could report results. The target was another fuel dump at the Chateau de Tertu, near Argentan, and Pathfinder crews said they saw yellow flames and heavy smoke after the bombing.

Later the same day, the 24th, crews on the battle order were briefed for what turned out to be the most fateful bombardment of the battle of Normandy. Details of the briefing were of such import that, in order to safeguard them, personnel of the entire base were restricted that night and until noon of the following day. It was an area bombing assignment, closely coordinated with other Groups, in support of the First U. S. Army, southwest of St Lo. The target was a rectangular area .8 miles East to West , and .5 miles from north to south, with the town of St. Giles in the center.

The "carpet bombardment" was scheduled to precede a break-through by the armored force and the infantry.

Ever since the fall of Cherbourg, such a break-through had been hoped for and anticipated by the Allied public as well as by forces based in Britain. Eagerness for a break-through frequently took the form of impatience with the slow progress reported in Normandy. But when it did, it showed lack of appreciation for the battle conditions on the far shore. Rolling terrain, swamp-land and heavy rains (the heaviest in 40 years), which had turned the clay soil into a sticky mud hole, had prevented extensive use of armor. Until the soil dried, it had to be an infantry battle, employing the technique of jungle warfare in the hedgerows, and that took time.

Now, on the 25th of July, American armor was ready to strike with the infantry. The Havocs of the 409th took off at 1000 hours. Major Milow and Lt. Ertler led the first box, Capt. Davis and Lt. Salzman, the second. The formation bombed at an average height of 9570 feet because of a 10/10 overcast at 10,000 feet. Both boxes got good results as witnessed by the strike attack photos.

Since then, we have had prisoner of war accounts to give us an idea of what it was like on the receiving end of that bombardment. German officers have told how they lay in their fox holes and watched the heavies come over, wave after wave, for a solid hour, followed by Marauders and Havocs for another half-hour. Loss of life and of materiel, it develops, was less important in paving the way for the break-through than the demoralization of men and disruption of communications. In any case, the carpet bombardment had the effect of pulling the plug. American armor and American infantry flowed through the widening gap, and the advance that was to lead to Coutances, Avranches, Rennes, Nantes, the Brest Peninsula, Le Mans, Argentan, Orleans, Chartres -- and Paris --- was on.

Two more targets in close support of ground forces followed for the 409th. On the 26th, a mission went out to attack an enemy strong-point head, Marigny, seven miles west of St. Lo, but 10/10 cloud at the target prevented an attack. Four days later, the 409th dropped fragmentation clusters, employing Pathfinder technique, on another enemy strong-point 2/7 miles south of Caumont. It was the first time Havocs had carried frags in this theater, and the mission was executed satisfactorily. Not, however without a loss that chilled the entire Group. On returning to base, Lt. Watson came in to land but had to pull up and go around again. Visibility was very poor, and when a formation of Marauders appeared just south of the field, flying low, Lt. Watson saw them too late to save himself. His wheels had just started to lower...he hadn’t enough airspeed to pull up’’’there were ships under him and to his right. He whipped his ship into a steep left turn , his wing pointed straight down. Then the ship fell, and a column of smoke and flames from the meadow south of the field marked the spot. Staff Sergeant Webb and Staff Sergeant Helland died with him.

It took another tragic crash to close out the month. The next day, a formation took off on a Pathfinder mission to bomb the railroad bridge at La Croiselle, two miles northeast of Conches. Long before they had successfully bombed and been diverted to other fields on there return, the base learned that Capt. Adams had crashed onto a golf course a mile north of Cambridge. His ship had caught prop wash climbing through the overcast and spun in. Capt. Adams escaped, but his crew, consisting of Lt. Briffett, a bombardier-navigator new to the Group, and Staff Sergeants Mattingly and McDowell were killed.

That was July, the month of the big break-through for the Allied forces in France, a month of change for the 409th. The Group flew 16 missions on 16 days, dropped 545 tons of bombs on Jerry, none on their fellow-Americans, despite an unfortunate newspaper story which misidentified Havocs as the ships responsible for the bombing of our own lines at St. Lo. The Group looked forward hopefully to August, with its promise of better flying weather and new victories for the Allies on the far shore.